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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the counterexamples to the general principles that: (1) a sentence as utterance has only one illocutionary force, in the sense of J.L. Austin; and (2) performative verbs do not normally retain illocutionary force in embedded contexts. Various tests for illocutionary force are applied, such as substitution of another speech act within the same syntactic context, co-occurence with modifiers, and comparison with sequences of separate sentences, which constitute independent speech acts. It is proposed that the nearest paraphrase to indirectly expressed speech acts (e.g. May I request...) is a prefatory speech act followed by the "main" speech act, and that such a sequence in discourse may be the source of idiomatic indirect expressions. It is concluded that NP modifiers, such as non-restrictive relative clauses, parentheticals, etc., do retain independent illocutionary force within another speech act, while modifiers of the speech act, such as prefatory clauses, do not. (Author)

Parasitic Speech Acts

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This paper discusses real and apparent exceptions to two general principles about subordinate speech acts. The two principles are:

I. Principle of Insubordination: speech acts cannot be freely embedded and retain illocutionary force.

II. Principle of One Thing at a Time: a speech act consisting of an independent utterance (ie. preceded and followed by silence) has only one illocutionary force, though often it is not clearly indicated what the force is.

The first principle, one of the earliest restrictions noted in linguistic discussions of the performative hypothesis (Ross 1970, Sadock 1969), is illustrated in the sentences of (1):

1) a. John tried to (*hereby) inform you that someone smashed into your car.
   b. People claim that I (*hereby) promise to bring you gold and jewels.
   c. It seems that I (*hereby) request that you lend me $100.

The speaker who utters these sentences does not thereby inform of an accident, make a promise or request a loan. Rather the speaker makes statements reporting such speech acts. The second principle is illustrated in (2):

2) a. I must ask you what you are doing with that turpentine.
   b. May I say that the reports of the weather are not very encouraging.

These sentences appear to violate principle I, since ask and say occur in embedded position and still have illocutionary force. Neither sentence, however, is both a statement and a question, simultaneously. (2)a is clearly a question, indirectly phrased, and (2)b is a statement. Responses to these sentences and the adverbials which may cooccur with them are determined by the conveyed illocutionary force, and show that these sentences are treated as having only one illocutionary force.

It is often not clear, however, whether a syntactically complex structure expresses one or more speech acts. If embedded in certain contexts, clauses seem to retain the illocutionary force they would have as independent utterances, though they are in some sense demoted to some secondary illocutionary status, in that they cannot be responded to independently and they are more or less irrelevant to the meaning and truth value of the embedding sentence:

3) Jerry, who is a CIA agent, makes a fine martini.
4) John-by the way, did you see him this morning?--owes me money from last week.
5) John is going to, is it Chicago? next week. (Lakoff 1974:324)

The point of uttering these sentences seems to be, mainly, making the statements expressed by the higher clauses. In contrast, the point of uttering (2) is to perform the speech act in subordinate position, while the higher material behaves more as a modifier on the utterance than as the speech act which its literal meaning would suggest. We thus have two classes of exceptions to principles I and II above, one containing the principle marker of illocutionary force in subordinate position, (2), and the other consisting of sentences with apparently more than one illocutionary force, the principle one being conveyed by the highest clause. (These exceptional cases are not of course mutually exclusive. It is possible to have a sentence like (2)a with a non-restrictive relative clause in it.)

While it is clear that there are exceptions to principles I and II, these principles have nevertheless a great deal of generality. It is desirable, therefore, to find some systematic characterization of the nature and function of the exceptions, for otherwise the necessity for ad hoc exceptions weakens the notion of speech act to the point where it has little meaning.[2]

A meaningful characterization must define the specific conditions for embedding, which include a description of the relationship between the speech act and the material which is syntactically superordinate, and a characterization of the status of the higher material as a speech act in its own right. This is at issue in the case of sentences like (2), and in fact there has been much disagreement over the best linguistic description of two important constructions, non-restrictive relative clauses and indirect speech acts, in which embedded speech acts occur.

What is necessary is a way of testing specific sub-parts of whole sentences for the presence and type of illocutionary force conveyed by that structure alone. The usual tests are often limited use in many of the cases to be considered in this paper. Sentences like (2) and (4) are hard to report in indirect discourse without altering the contents of the quoted speech act. Non-restrictive relative clauses, like the one in (3), cannot be replied to, or denied, separately from the rest of the sentence, unless subordinate clause is repeated in full. Other tests include intonation, possible preceding or subsequent sentences, co-occurence restrictions on sentence adverbials, the ability to undergo syntactic rules and the possibility of substituting other speech acts in the same syntactic context. In addition to using the tests among these which can be applied in a specific case, I propose to use another strategy for testing for illocutionary force and for defining the semantic or pragmatic relationship among clauses. The sentences in (2)-(5) contain subordinate clauses. These combinations have approximate, though not exact paraphrases in sequences of separate senterces, each constituting a speech act in its own right. The order of sentences in this paraphrase and the nature of the connecting links will give information about the relationship between clauses in the combined version. The differences between the combined and sequential versions, in emphasis, illocutionary force and ability to undergo syntactic rules, will help define the status of the individual clauses as autonomous speech acts.

I would first like to use non-restrictive relative clauses as an illustration of one type of subordinate speech acts, and then to compare them with similar constructions, parenthetical clauses and the exclamations and disclaimers discussed in Lakoff 1974. The following evidence has been offered for considering non-restrictive relatives as autonomous speech acts. First, the intonation contour on non-restrictives is independent of the intonation of the matrix sentence, and often involves lowering of pitch as well as distinct pauses before and after. Second, sentences adverbials like clearly, unfortunately, if I remember correctly, which may co-occur with assertions, are also possible with unmarked, assertion-like non-restrictive relatives. Third, the speaker may shift addressees to another person present (an example of which is discussed in Sadock 1975:68). Finally, there can be many different kinds of speech acts in either the relative clause or the matrix sentence though certain imperative and question sentences are excluded from the relative clause.[3]

Below are some examples of the variations and combinations of illocutionary force which are possible in non-restrictive relatives; some of these may seem odd because it is hard to imagine when one would want to say them.

6) Does Henry, who hasn't been here very long, realize the situation?
7) Tell Henry, who hasn't been here very long, what the situation is.
8) I advise you to see Fred, who owns a lot of properties, about finding an apartment.

The relative clause in these sentences contains further information asserted by the speaker describing a NP occurring in the embedding sentence. In the following sentences, the speaker uses the relative clause to perform another speech act, specified by an overt performative verb or indirect expression. This speech act is somehow incidental to the speech act which is the main point of the utterance.

9) Fred, who I advise you to see about finding an apartment, has been here a long time.
10) Henry, who I warn you is deaf and crotchety, is the only one who can help you find back numbers of Vanity Fair.

Both embedded and non-embedded clauses can be used to perform acts other than assertions:

11) Does Henry, who I advise you not to take literally, really know the people involved?
11) Ask Susan, who I warn you is not in a good mood, to see me as soon as possible.

Both the embedded relative clause and the higher, embedding clause freely allow many different kinds of speech acts, from which it is concluded that the unmarked form in (3) also contains an embedded assertion, within an assertion.

The connecting link between the relative clause and embedding context is of course the shared NP, and also some conjunction like and, because or though inferrable from the contents of the two clauses. A paraphrase of (8) would probably link the two clauses with because, while (13) would be paraphrased as (14):

12) I advise you to see Fred about finding an apartment, because he has been here a long time.
13) And Brat, who had no love for the Cloth, found himself liking the Rector. (J. Tey, Brat Farrar p. 111)
14) a. And Brat, though he had no love for the Cloth, found himself...
b. And Brat found himself liking the Rector, though he had no love...

(14) a is a better equivalent of (13) than (14) b, because of the position of the embedded clause. Position next to the NP in the higher clause, secondary status while retaining illocutionary force and some pragmatically inferrable clause connective are characteristics of non-restrictive relative clauses[4], and I will argue that they are characteristic of other constructions as well.

Parenthetical sentences are very much like non-restrictive relative clauses, except that the association between the two clauses may be minimal.

15) a. My cousin Fred--by the way, I advise you to talk to him about finding an apartment--has been here a long time.
b. I advise you to ask my cousin Fred--by the way, he's been here a long time--about finding an apartment.
c. I advise you to ask my cousin Fred--he has a miniature Schnauzer called Eric--about finding an apartment.

The parenthetical may be related as closely as in the case of non-restrictives or as loosely as in (15) c, where the clauses are linked by some association of ideas relating to the shared NP. (Of course the parenthetical may be unrelated to the other speech act.) What distinguishes parentheticals from

non-restrictives is the impression that the parenthetical interruption is unplanned[5], while the inclusion of a relative clause is deliberate. The relative clause form is deliberately exploited stylistically in (13) for the purpose of contrasting two propositions about an individual. The effect of antithesis would be much weaker if a parenthetical had been used.

Some particularly interesting types of sentences containing embedded speech acts are discussed in George Lakoff's paper on amalgams (Lakoff 1974). I will discuss two here briefly. They are (i) exclamations modifying a NP in an assertion and (ii) various devices for commenting on a NP description or indicating uncertainty.

16) a. John invited you'll never guess how many people to his party[6].
b. You'll never guess how many!
c. John invited {x number of / some} people to his party. You'll never guess...

17) a. John is going to, is it Chicago on Saturday.
b. John is going somewhere on Saturday. Is it Chicago?
c. John is going somewhere on Saturday. It's Chicago, isn't it?
d. Is it Chicago that John is going to on Saturday?

These constructions do not allow as many possibilities of different speech acts as the preceding examples. The embedded exclamation in (16) a can have exactly the stressed intonation of an unembedded exclamation like (16) b , and many different ways of expressing an exclamation can, as Lakoff points out, be incorporated into a NP in a sentence. This context is usually but not always an assertion. (18) is a possible warning, though usually an exclamation which leaves out details about a referent in a speech act will vitiate the speech act, as in (19):

18) I warn you that there are you won't believe how many reporters in the next room.

19)?I promise to send you God knows what.

In sentences like (17) a, the higher speech act may be something other than an assertion also.

20) I advise you to get, is it a power of attorney from your aunt.

It is possible to advise someone to get a document the name of which is not quite clear in the speaker's mind, though it is odd advice if the speaker really does not know the name of the document. These two possibilities correspond to two readings of (17)a., paraphrased by the request for a yes or no answer in (17)b and the request for confirmation in (17) c. The embedded question in (17)a is enough like a real question that it has question intonation and requires some kind of response. (17) a can be used either as a question or as a reminder, or as a way of deferring to the hearer, who may be in a better position to know John's plans than the speaker.[7] In any case both the embedded clause and the higher clause exhibit properties of genuine speech acts. The function of the embedded clause is to modify a NP and to express on the spot as it were some attitude of the speaker, something not quite captured by the sequential paraphrases in (16)c and (17)b,c. Yet the embedded speech act is as separate from the matrix sentence as if were a subsequent independent sentence with its own illocutionary force.

The preceding examples have all involved embedded clauses, more or less productive in illocutionary force, which all modified NPs within another sentence. The higher clause in these examples has also included speech acts of many different types, with a fairly wide range of illocutionary force.

I will now turn to a different and more difficult class of embedded speech acts. The embedded speech act, as in (2), is the primary one, expressing the actual illocutionary force of the sentence, though the higher material seems to be another speech act. This higher material has the function of expressing the speaker's attitude about the speech act, as I will argue from paraphrase relations. I will argue also that the higher material has meaning, but has no autonomous illocutionary force, not even the force of an assertion.

The adverbials in (21) and (22) are most plausibly associated with the speech act itself, giving position in the discourse (for the fortieth time) or expressing the speaker's attitude toward the truth of the statement being made.

21) {For the fortieth time / For the last time / Finally} we recommend replacing Niagra Falls with a plastic replica.

22) {Clearly / Unfortunately} John is going to win the election.

If they are adverbials which are predicated of the performative verb, then it might be expected that, like other manner or time adverbials, they could be negated, questioned or asserted separately from the proposition they are predicated of (Lakoff 1970).[8] These, however, cannot be questioned or negated though they clearly are separate from the speech act they modify. Clearly is not part of the proposition asserted in (22), for if it were, it should be part of what is pronominalized by the anaphoric pronoun that in (24) ..

23) It is {clear / clearly true} that John will win the election, but some people don't know that. (that = it is clear...)

24) Clearly, John is going to win the election, but some people don't know that. (that = John is going to win..)

While that in (23) may be ambiguous, it is not in (24). (25) a and b also show a difference.

25) a. It is clear that John is going to win the election, though it wasn't last week.

b. * Clearly John is going to win the election, though it wasn't last week.

If the adverbial were asserted separately, however, another set of predictions would be made about anaphoric processes, so that one would expect (26) a and b to be similar.[9]

26)a. Although you don't want me to, I will repeat this for the fortieth time. Your brother is no good.

b. *Although you don't want me to, for the fortieth time, your brother is no good.

The adverbial is asserted in (26)a, and aside from the question of anaphora, it is doubtful that its assertion exactly reproduces the status of such an adverbial in (21). The same is true of sentence adverbials like clearly in (27):

27) a. Although most people don't know it, the following is clear. John is going to win the election.

b. Although most people don't know it, clearly, John is going to win the election.

These sentences are not synonymous, because of the difference in what it is anaphoric for. I conclude that the adverbials are outside the speech act they modify, and thus are higher predicates without independent illocutionary force. I will argue that this is generally the case for speech act modifiers.

Indirect speech acts, including sentences of the type exemplified in (28), have been the subject of much disagreement, concerning the relationship between their literal meaning and illocutionary force, and their conveyed meaning and illocutionary force.

28) a. Let me say that this lemon mousse is delicious.
b. May I ask you to turn down your stereo.
c. I must ask where you were last night.
d. I regret to inform you that the old grey goose is dead.

The non-literal use of (28)a, which has the form of an imperative, conveys a statement, and (28)d is normally used to inform, rather than to make statements about the speaker's feelings. Of great importance to the question of the relationship between literal and conveyed meaning is the status of the higher material as an illocutionary act. If sentences like the ones in (28) are used non-literally, do they have two illocutionary forces, and if not, which of the two components has illocutionary force? I have argued elsewhere (Davison 1975) that the conveyed illocutionary force of sentences like (28) is relevant for rule operations and co-occurence restrictions and that in general the restrictions on indirectly conveyed speech acts are the same as for directly expressed speech acts of the same illocutionary force. I contend therefore that the illocutionary force of (28)a, for example, is that of a statement and not a request, when it conveys a request. But whether one agrees with this contention or not, the imperative clause let me V must be accounted for, as having illocutionary force or not.

It is generally agreed that higher material like let me V, I regret to V, etc., expresses something about the speaker's attitude toward the conveyed speech act, and so it has almost an adverbial function, like clearly in the preceding section. Gordon and Lakoff (1971) have noted the connection between the semantic contents of the indirect expression and various conditions for sincere, reasonable and polite speech. The higher material in the sentences in (28) could be viewed as what might be used to preface a speech act. Speakers often precede a speech act with something which indicates a belief that the speech act is reasonable and warranted and done with due consideration for the hearer.[10]

This fact provides justification for constructing two-sentence paraphrases of the sentences below. The properties of the preface sentence as an autonomous speech act will be compared with its properties in combination.

29) a. May I ask what the flat-bed truck is doing in the driveway?
b. May I ask you something? What is the flat-bed truck doing in the driveway?
c. May I ask you, what is the flat-bed truck doing in the driveway?

30) a. Let me say that the preface could be a little shorter.
b. Let me say this/something. The preface could be a little shorter.
c. Let me say this, that the preface could be a little shorter.

31) a. I must request that you put out your cigar.
b. I must request that you do the following. Please put out your cigar.
c. I must ask you, please put out your cigar.

32) a. I regret to inform you that your petition has been refused.
b. I regret to say this. Your petition has been refused.[11]
c. I am sorry to do this to you, but your petition has been refused.

33) a. I am pleased to announce that the prize for the best tango goes to Mr. and Mrs. Harbottle.
b. I am pleased to say the following. The prize for the best tango goes

33) b. to Mr. and Mrs. Harbottle.
c. I am pleased to say this, that the prize for the best tango goes to Mr. and Mrs. Harbottle.

The (a) sentences have been given two sentence paraphrases in the (b) sentences, and another paraphrase in the (c) sentences, which is intermediate between the sequences in (b) and the subordinate constructions in (29)-(33)a. It is my impression that the first clause in the (c) version has the same non-literal meaning (and the same function of ackowledging an intrusion on the addressee) as the higher clause in the (a) sentences. In the (b) sentences, on the other hand, the preferred reading is the literal one, and the addressee might be expected to reply to the requests for permission in (29) and (30), or to believe that the speakers of (32) and (33) are genuinely regretful or happy.

If another clause is conjoined to the left of the prefatory sentence, the result, which I find acceptable, forces the literal reading for the preface. If such conjunction is attempted with the (a) or (c) versions, the result is odd.

34) a. Let me say that the punch is delicious.
b. Give John some more cake, and let me say something. The punch is delicious.
c. *Give John some more cake, and let me say that the punch is delicious.

35) a. Let me say that the preface could be shorter.
b. Go talk to the editor, but first, let me say something. The preface could be shorter.
c.*Go talk to the editor but let me say that the preface could be shorter.
d. ?Go talk to the editor, but let me say this, that the preface could be shorter.

36) a. May I say that something needs to be done about the noise.
b. Can Mary use your phone, and may I say something? Something needs to be done about the noise.
c. *Can Mary use your phone and may I say that something needs to be done about the noise.

37) a. I regret to tell you that I am resigning as of next week.
b. John felt bad about leaving and I regret to tell you the following. I am resigning as of next week.
c.* John felt bad about leaving and I regret to tell you that I am resigning as of next week.

(34)c-(37)c are strange if the second clause is taken as being an indirectly expressed speech act equivalent to (34)a-(37)a.

Part of the strangeness results from the combination of different speech acts; conjunctions of questions and statements are usually strange, for example. But (37)c conjoins two statements, the second of which conveys an act of informing, which is a sub-variety of statement. So difference of illocutionary force is not the whole explanation. Conjunction of literal and non-literal intended meaning violates the condition on coordinate conjunction that the conjuncts must be in some way instances of the same thing (R. Lakoff 1971). So we are forced to conclude that indirectly expressed speech acts differ greatly from literal ones, and in particular that the higher material in an indirect speech act has some different semantic status as compared with the same material in the literal reading. I suggest that the difference, which is relevant for determining well-formedness of conjunctions of clauses, is that there is no illocutionary force associated with the higher clause, and it should be treated very much like a sentence adverbial modifying the

actual speech act conveyed by the sentence.

In the next section I will discuss some other cases of performative verb modifiers, subordinate clauses introduced by because, if, since, etc. While they occur with a wide variety of different speech acts, they are independent of the illocutionary force of the speech act they occur with. The function of such clauses is to express the speaker's beliefs about whether the conditions are met for sincere and reasonable performance of the speech act.

38) a. Larry is here, if I remember correctly.
b. Larry is here, if you didn't know that already.
c. Larry is here, {if that's his dog outside. / since/because/as/for that's his dog outside.}

39) a. Is Larry here? {if that's his dog outside. / since/as/because/for that's his dog outside. / if you have any information about him.}

The subordinate conjunctions in both (38) and (39) have the same form, though the principal speech act in one case is a statement and in the other a question.

The question to be asked about the illocutionary force, if any, of the adverbial clause actually has two parts. One concerns the possibility of the complement clause of the adverbial containing a speech act in its own, and here some evidence exists in the possibilities of substituting different types of speech acts in this context. The second question is whether the whole subordinate structure, including the conjunction, is asserted or not. This is a difficult question to answer categorically, but the first question provides some indications of a negative sort.

The complement clauses mostly have the unmarked form shared by assertions, presupposed clauses, etc. But there are some instances of what look like questions and imperatives. Note that the variety of conjunctions possible here decreases markedly, by comparison with (38) and (39).

40) John won the lottery, {because/ ? for have you seen the car he's driving?!}[12] / {*since/*as/*if have you seen the car...}

41) John won the lottery, because, let me say, that's some car he's driving.

42) Did John win the lottery? {because get a load of the car he's driving! / *for/*since/*as/*if " " }

43) Are you tired of living? {because/?for, consider the alternative. / *since/*as/*if " " }

44) Are you thinking of dealing dope? {because, don't.[13] / *for/*since/*as/*if don't.}

In (40)-(42), because and virtually no other conjunctions precedes various forms of exclamations, which convoy some sort of proposition, one which could be asserted. Only exclamations are possible, and not real questions of information, such as whether the addressee had actually seen the car in question, or real imperatives. It is not clear how one could get a load of something if one were to try to obey (42) as a literal imperative. Thus only assertion-like propositions can occur as complements of these conjunctions, or structures like the exclamations above or rhetorical questions, which convey assertions. (43) and (44) are just as heavily restricted as to possible conjunction. Because in these examples is often reduced to 'cause, and its function is to link the preceding speech act to the one which follows. The preceding speech act establishes an appropriate context in which the following one is warranted. Thus the advice in (43) and (44) is given only after the speaker tries to establish if it is needed by the addressee. A fuller paraphrase would be: because, if so, don't, in (44). Because in the pre-

ceding examples (40)-(42) cannot be so paraphrased, and so is a different use of because from (43) and (44). In these latter examples, there indeed seems to be an autonomous speech act following because, in fact one which is the principal speech act in these utterances. But in the preceding examples, it is clear that the complement cannot be considered a separate speech act. It is suggestive that imperative and question surface structures only occur with because, which is the only conjunction of the five mentioned here which can be asserted (as in It's because they like spaghetti that they eat so much of it.). Yet because is equivalent in many ways to unassertable conjunctions like since, in (40)-(42).

The exceptions to Principles I and II are, I have tried to show, quite systematic. All of the cases discussed here concern structures which function as modifiers, expressing beliefs or attitudes of the speaker about some part of the 'primary' speech act. What these structures modify determines whether they have their own autonomous illocutionary force. NP hedges and modifiers are much more like independent speech acts than speech act adverbials. The contrast between the examples discussed in the first half of this paper and those discussed in the second half, is quite striking, even though non-restrictive relative clauses and others are secondary to the speech act in which they are embedded. This is not a surprising state of affairs. NP modifiers share only a sub-part of the speech act they are included in syntactically, while speech act modifiers are predicated of the entire speech act they occur in syntactically. The latter case is the really exceptional one, since the semantic relations between speech act and modifier are exactly the opposite of the syntactic relations. Although the same beliefs can be expressed as assertions preceding a speech act, the only way that the language can get away with predicating adverbials of a speech act is by including the adverbial in a general way within the illocutionary force of the speech act which it modifies. That is, the adverbial appears to be assertion-like by virtue of its relation to some speech act. Such modifiers are parasitic on the speech act they are predicated of; the pattern proposed here will then automatically categorize doubtful cases and restrict in a systematic way the description of structures as embedded speech acts.

Notes

I am grateful to Mark Aronoff and Jerry Sadock for discussion of some of the points in this paper, and to Peter Cole, Georgia Green and Jerry Morgan for criticism of an earlier draft.

1. Questions and imperatives cannot occur in relative clauses, though indirectly conveyed ones are often acceptable. Imperative and interrogative structures can be used to convey statements in NRRC, however. As Jerry Sadock has suggested, questions may be generally unacceptable because they demand a response, in the middle of some other speech act.

2. Hooper and Thompson (1973), for example, propose to account for the operation of rules in subordinate clauses, when these rules normally occur in highest clauses, by saying that these rules apply in assertions. They offer few criteria, other than tests for presupposition and the operation of the rules in question, for defining what an embedded assertion is, and include in this category not only NRRC but also quoted speech acts and the reason clauses discussed later. Part of the looseness of the description of asser-

tions lies in a failure to distinguish what is asserted (as opposed to what is presupposed) from assertion, a speech act subject to a set of felicity conditions. Green 1975 criticizes the conclusion of Hooper and Thompson, and shows that the conditions on the operation of main clause phenomena are a complex mixture of pragmatic, semantic and syntactic factors.

3. See note 1.

4. These characteristics are not shared by restrictive relative clauses. It is interesting that restrictives can be postposed (extraposition from NP), while non-restrictive relative clauses cannot be.

i) A thief, who was wearing a mask, came in. ≠

ii) A thief came in who was wearing a mask.

5. I owe this obervation to Jerry Morgan.

6. (16)a and (17)a are quoted from Lakoff 1974:321, 324, but the paraphrases given here are my own.

7. I owe this obervation to George Lakoff.

8. It might be objected that the evidence for adverbials as higher predicates comes from present generic sentences. (21) certainly is more generic than not, since it at least implies that the recommendation has been made many times before.

9. As was pointed out earlier, in connection with non-restrictive relative clauses, the sequential paraphrases with conjunctions are not perfect equivalents of the combined forms. They require, as in this case, the insertion of lexical material which is inferrable from the combined version. In this case, the difference in illocutionary force is much more noticeable than for non-restrictive relative clauses.

10. The examples here concern general conditions on speech acts, statements of obligation to say something which may disturb the addressee and requests for permission to speak. Gordon and Lakoff 1971 give other examples where conditions on specific acts, like requests, are the basis for conveying a request. Eg. Would you V? concerns the willingness of the addressee, as a request implies that the speaker believes that the hearer is willing to carry out the request. It is often the case that a speaker first establishes that the conditions hold for a speech act before attempting to perform it, particularly when the act is serious.

11. If regret has as its object a speech act which has not yet occurred, the problem is avoided that would arise if regret is treated as being asserted, in which case it presupposes as having happened a speech act which is in progress at the time of utterance.

12. This sentence was suggested by a sentence in Liberman 1973.

13. This sentence was suggested by one in D. Sayers, Murder Must Advertise, p. 152.

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od his own judgement in deciding what is and what is not
e target language, and how that sentence is appropriately

concerns the function of grading in language teaching
s sometimes been suggested (e.g. Newmark 1964) that
rules in a transformational grammar has implications for
material in a teaching syllabus which may be different
nal principles of grading. This view suggests a contrast
ing grammar in which the ordering of material is de-
ystem of formal rules and a teaching grammar in which
ally unmotivated since it is based on an intuitive or
of the relative complexity of structures. Thus, Newmark
a teaching grammar based on the rules in *Syntactic*
l sentences will be taught first, then obligatory trans-
optional transformations. Accordingly, we would not
questions, which involve transformations, until after the
have been taught. This conflicts with the usual practice,
duce questions at the beginning of a course because of the
f exercises and drills which can then be made available
. We cannot take this argument seriously, however, since
istence of an important difference in principle between a
ar and language teaching material based on it. A peda-
consists of a selection of material drawn from one or
grammars and presented according to principles which
matic and which have nothing to do with the axioms of
uestion concerning the order of presentation of teaching
decided on the basis of the pedagogic grammar, not of
ammar. It does not necessarily follow that linguistic
otally irrelevant to questions of grading, since work in
uistics may well be a source of useful ideas about the
material in the classroom. However, it must always be
se ideas are realized in a manner consistent with the
a particular teaching situation. In other words, the
uistic grammar may suggest, but not dictate, the arrange-
in a pedagogic grammar, since the essentially pragmatic
frequency, usefulness, relevance to situation, etc., must
grammar which is intended for teaching purposes.

grammar in second language teaching

ed several cases in which views about the relationship
ic theory and language teaching practice are rendered
dency on the part of linguists to over-generalize, and to

assume that an approach which may be helpful in handling one particular problem must necessarily be valid for all aspects of language and language learning. We must now consider briefly the role of grammar in second language teaching, and the extent to which a conscious knowledge of the rules can be expected to help a student in his attempts to acquire a practical mastery of the language.

According to Chomsky and his followers a simple habit structure view of language is inadequate as the sole basis for a theory of human language behaviour, nor can it be accepted as central to such a theory, since it fails to account for exactly those qualities that make human language behaviour unique, in particular a speaker's ability to produce and understand sentences that he has never seen or heard before. However, the present trend away from a habit structure view of language and in the direction of language as rule-governed behaviour does not mean that teachers must begin to encourage conscious rule-learning in every part of the syllabus. There is no reason why habit-formation theory should not be invoked to account for some features of language, nor is it necessarily the case that the whole of human language behaviour is based on the operation of deep-level rules. For example it is quite true, as Rivers points out, that the 'habitual, automatic associations' operating in certain areas of grammar (e.g. subject-verb agreement, the fixed forms for interrogation and negation, the formal features of tenses) do not always require intellectual analysis, and may be learned 'without more than an occasional word of explanation' (Rivers 1968). In other cases, however, learning may be impossible without a conscious understanding of the rule involved. Thus, a student could perform drills based on the model sentences *I've lived here for two years*, *I've lived here for six months* on the one hand, and *I've lived here since 1965*, *I've lived here since last Christmas* on the other hand, and still produce the erroneous forms **I've lived here for 1965*, **I've lived here since two years*, because he has not perceived the underlying rule that 'since' is used in English for naming time and 'for' is used for counting time. With this type of problem in mind Carroll has suggested that aural-oral methods might be more successful 'if, instead of presenting the student with a fixed, predetermined lesson to be learned, the teacher created a "problem solving" situation in which the student must find ... the appropriate verbal response for solving the problem'. As a result the student would be forced 'to learn, by a kind of trial-and-error process, to *communicate* rather than merely to utter the speech patterns in the lesson plans' (Carroll 1961).

Rivers (1968) accepts that language is rule-governed behaviour, and that one of the tasks of language teaching is to find ways of helping students to internalize the rules, but how do we teach the grammar of a language? According to Rivers, language use involves both lower-order